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INTRODUCTION
The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution provides that “Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion.”1 These ten words have frustrated scholars,
lower courts, and at times, the U.S. Supreme Court itself.2 Confusion
over the correct interpretation of the Establishment Clause recently
manifested itself in the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals.3 In 2010, the
U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin held that a
suburban school district’s practice of holding its graduation

 J.D. candidate, May 2013, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of
Technology; B.A., May 2010, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.
1
U.S. CONST. amend I.
2
See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 674-76 (1989) (Kennedy,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“Deciding cases on the basis of such an
unguided examination of marginalia is irreconcilable with the imperative of applying
neutral principles in constitutional adjudication.”).
3
Doe ex rel. Doe v. Elmbrook Sch. Dist., 687 F.3d 840, 842 (7th Cir. 2012).
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ceremonies in a church comported with the Establishment Clause.4 On
appeal, a three-judge panel of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed the judgment of the District Court.5 The plaintiffs then filed a
petition for rehearing en banc.6 The Seventh Circuit granted the
petition and, sitting en banc, reversed the decision of the three-judge
panel, finding that the school district’s practice of holding graduation
in a church violated the Establishment Clause.7 Judge Ripple, Judge
Posner, and Judge Easterbrook filed dissenting opinions.8
This Comment will (1) provide a brief summary of current
Establishment Clause jurisprudence; (2) review graduation venue
litigation prior to Doe ex rel. Doe v. Elmbrook School District;
(3) analyze the reasoning of the Seventh Circuit’s en banc opinion; and
(4) assert that the en banc opinion improperly applied the endorsement
and coercion tests.
I.

MODERN ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
JURISPRUDENCE
A. Confusion in the Courts

There is significant disagreement among federal courts and within
the Supreme Court itself over how to correctly analyze cases that arise
under the Establishment Clause.9 In 1992, a First Amendment expert
4

Does 1, 7, 8, and 9, individually v. Elmbrook Joint Common Sch. Dist. No.
21, No. 09-C-0409, 2010 WL 2854287, at *15 (E.D. Wis. July 19, 2010) aff'd sub
nom. Doe ex rel. Doe v. Elmbrook Sch. Dist., 658 F.3d 710 (7th Cir. 2011), reh’g en
banc granted, opinion vacated (Nov. 17, 2011) and rev’d and remanded sub nom.
Doe ex rel. Doe v. Elmbrook Sch. Dist., 687 F.3d 840 (7th Cir. 2012).
5
Doe ex rel. Doe v. Elmbrook Sch. Dist., 658 F.3d 710, 734 (7th Cir. 2011),
reh’g en banc granted, opinion vacated (Nov. 17, 2011).
6
Doe ex rel. Doe, 687 F.3d at 842.
7
Id. at 856.
8
Id. at 861, 869, 872.
9
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 861
(1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“[O]ur Establishment Clause jurisprudence is in
hopeless disarray.”).
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and former federal appellate judge said simply of the U.S. Supreme
Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence: “It is a mess.”10 More
recently, a scholar likened the U.S. Supreme Court’s repeated attempts
to formulate comprehensive Establishment Clause analyses to “a
Creole chef continually tinkering with his recipe for jambalaya.”11
Indeed, Justice Thomas himself once wrote, “[o]ur jurisprudential
confusion [in Establishment Clause cases] has led to results that can
only be described as silly.”12
No case illustrates the Establishment Clause dilemma better than
County of Allegheny v. ACLU.13 In Allegheny, the plaintiff challenged
the constitutionality of a nativity scene located inside a courthouse and
a 45-foot Christmas tree and 18-foot menorah located in front of a
government building.14 These simple facts spawned a 5-4 decision and
four separate opinions, all interpreting the Court’s Establishment
Clause jurisprudence differently.15 Ultimately, the Court held that the
nativity scene violated the Establishment Clause while the tree and
menorah did not.16 Allegheny demonstrates the Court’s own struggle
with the Establishment Clause and further complicates lower courts’
understanding of how to properly decide Establishment Clause cases.
Doe ex rel. Doe v. Elmbrook School District further exemplifies this
confusion through its improper application of the endorsement and
coercion tests.

10

Michael W. McConnell, Exchange, Religious Freedom at a Crossroads, 59
U. CHI. L. REV. 115, 120 (1992).
11
Lynn S. Branham, “The Devil is in the Details”: A Continued Dissection of
the Constitutionality of Faith-Based Prison Units, 6 AVE MARIA L. REV. 409, 412
(2008).
12
Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 45 n. 1 (2004)
(Thomas, J., concurring).
13
492 U.S. 573 (1989).
14
Id. at 579, 582-83.
15
Id. at 623-79.
16
Id. at 621.
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B. The Three Establishment Clause Tests
Courts use three tests to determine whether governmental action
violates the Establishment Clause: (1) the Lemon test;17 (2) the
endorsement test;18 and (3) the coercion test.19 The Court’s various
attempts to simplify the application of the tests further convoluted the
way federal district courts and federal courts of appeal utilized them to
properly adjudicate cases arising under the Establishment Clause.20
1.

The Lemon Test

In Lemon v. Kurtzman, the U.S. Supreme Court overturned a
Pennsylvania statute that permitted salary subsidies for parochial
school teachers.21 In its analysis, the Court applied a three-prong test
that came to be known as the Lemon test. 22 To pass the Lemon test, the
challenged governmental action must (1) “have a secular legislative
purpose”; (2) have a “principal or primary effect . . . that neither
advances nor inhibits religion”; and (3) “not foster an excessive
government entanglement with religion.”23 However, as one First
Amendment scholar and former federal appellate judge noted, “[e]ach
part of the Lemon test is deeply ambiguous . . . Consequently, the
lower federal courts and state courts have given the test widely

17

Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
Cnty. of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 593-94.
19
Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 587 (1992).
20
Erin R. Doyle, Casenotes, Endangering the Great Divide: Challenges to the
Establishment Clause in Van Orden v. Perry, 31 S. ILL. U. L.J. 123, 130 (“[T]he
Court’s inability to draw a consistent line has created convoluted and ambiguous
Establishment Clause jurisprudence.”).
21
Lemon, 403 U.S. at 602.
22
Id.
23
Id. at 612-13 (internal quotation omitted).
18
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different and seemingly contradictory interpretations, and they often
ignore it altogether to avoid undesirable results.”24
a.

Lemon’s First Prong: Secular Purpose

To satisfy the first prong of the Lemon test, the challenged
governmental action must have a secular purpose.25 However, in
McCreary County, Kentucky v. American Civil Liberties Union of
Kentucky,26 the Supreme Court stated that the challenged
governmental action need not be exclusively secular; rather, it need
only be predominantly secular.27 However, Judge Easterbrook, one of
the dissenters in Doe,28 has severely criticized such an analysis.29
Further, courts disagree as to whether they should examine the
governmental action as a whole or focus solely on the religious
component.30 While the Supreme Court has said that “[f]ocus[ing]
exclusively on the religious component of any activity would
inevitably lead to its invalidation under the Establishment Clause,”31
the Court had not always adhered to this approach.32 For example, in
Wallace v. Jaffree, the Court examined an Alabama statute that
authorized a moment of silence before each school day for

24

Michael W. McConnell, Stuck with a Lemon: A new test for establishment
clause cases would help ease current confusion, 83 A.B.A. J. 46, 46 (Feb. 1997).
25
Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13.
26
545 U.S. 844 (2005).
27
Id. at 860.
28
Doe ex rel. Doe v. Elmbrook Sch. Dist., 687 F.3d 840, 869 (7th Cir. 2012).
29
See Am. Jewish Cong. v. City of Chicago, 827 F.2d 120, 130 (7th Cir. 1987)
(Easterbrook, J., dissenting) (“It would be appalling to conduct litigation under the
Establishment Clause as if it were a trademark case, with experts testifying about
whether one display is really like another, and witnesses testifying they were
offended—but would have been less so were the crèche five feet closer to the jumbo
candy cane.”).
30
Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 86 (1985) (J., Burger, dissenting).
31
Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 680 (1984).
32
Wallace, 472 U.S. at 58-59.
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“‘meditation or voluntary prayer.’”33 In its analysis, the Court focused
exclusively on the words “or voluntary prayer” because “the only
significant . . . difference is the addition of the words ‘or voluntary
prayer.’”34 Without clear direction from the Supreme Court, lower
courts are left guessing whether to examine challenged government
action as a whole or to only scrutinize the religious component.
b.

Lemon’s Second Prong: Principal Effect Must Not Advance
or Inhibit Religion

To satisfy Lemon’s second prong, governmental action must not
have the primary effect of advancing or inhibiting religion.35 This
effect-based analysis is also fraught with problems. Specifically, “it
fails to specify a baseline for comparison.”36 Lower courts are left to
determine whether the “primary effect” of the challenged action
“advanc[es] or inhibt[s] religion.”37 This becomes especially
complicated when the challenged action contains both religious and
secular components.38
c.

Lemon’s Third Prong: Excessive Entanglement

To satisfy Lemon’s third prong, governmental action must not
foster excessive entanglement with religion.39 The Lemon Court
described “excessive entanglement” as government action that would
result in “comprehensive, discriminating, and continuing state

33

472 U.S. 38, 40 (1985) (citing Ala. Code § 16-1-20.1 (Supp. 1984)).
Id. at 58-59.
35
Lemon v. Kurtzman , 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
36
McConnell, supra note 24.
37
Id.
38
Id. (McConnell elaborates, “If a government program extends benefits to a
wide spectrum of private groups, secular as well as religious, does this ‘advance’
religion? The answer, according to the courts, is sometimes ‘yes,’ sometimes ‘no.’”).
39
Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13.
34
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surveillance.”40 The Lemon Court explained that the excessive
entanglement prong centers on the evaluation of three factors: (1) “the
character and purposes of the institutions that . . . benefit[]” from the
governmental action; (2) “the nature of the aid that the State provides”
to religious institutions; and (3) “the resulting relationship between the
government and the religious authority.”41 However, because all
religious institutions necessarily maintain at least some form of
contact with governmental entities, “there is no way to tell whether the
entanglement is excessive.”42 As a result, “[t]he cases are all over the
map.”43
The Court’s inconsistent application of the Lemon test has brought
the test under great scrutiny.44 Justice Scalia likened the Lemon test to
a “ghoul in a late-night horror movie that repeatedly sits up in its grave
and shuffles abroad, after being repeatedly killed and buried.”45
However, regardless of Scalia’s disdain for the Lemon test, because
Lemon has not been expressly overruled, it is still binding precedent
on lower courts.46
2.

The Endorsement Test

Originally authored by Justice O’Connor in Lynch v. Donnelly,47
the endorsement test is essentially a narrower version of the second

40

Id. at 619.
Id. at 615.
42
McConnell, supra note 24 at 47.
43
Id.
44
Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 399
(Scalia, J., concurring) (“When we wish to strike down a practice [the Lemon test]
forbids, we invoke it; when we wish to uphold a practice it forbids, we ignore it
entirely.” (citation omitted)).
45
Id. at 398.
46
Books v. Elkhart Cnty., Ind., 401 F.3d 857, 862-63 (7th Cir. 2005) (“Despite
persistent criticism from several of the Justices, Lemon has not been overruled, and
we are compelled to follow the approach it established.”).
47
465 U.S. 668 (1984).
41
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prong of the Lemon test.48 The endorsement test prohibits government
entities “from conveying or attempting to convey a message that
religion or a particular religious belief is favored or preferred.”49 To
satisfy the endorsement test, “an objective, reasonable observer, aware
of the history and context of the community and forum in which the
religious display appears,” must not “fairly understand the display to
be a government endorsement of religion.”50
However, Justice O’Connor further complicated the endorsement
test in Elk Grove Unified School District v. Newdow.51 There, she laid
out four additional factors which must be examined before concluding
that governmental action violates the Establishment Clause: (1) history
and ubiquity; (2) absence of worship or prayer; (3) absence of
reference to a particular religion; and (4) minimal religious content.52
She also asserted that judges must weigh the facts before them against
the aforementioned factors to determine if the challenged
governmental action conveys a message that religion or a religious
belief is “favored” or “preferred.”53
3.

The Coercion Test

The third and final test that the Supreme Court uses in
Establishment Clause cases is the coercion test.54 The coercion test
provides that “government may not coerce anyone to support or
participate in religion or its exercise.”55 However, in the context of
48

Id. at 688-89. (“It has never been entirely clear, however, how the three parts
of the [Lemon] test relate to the principles enshrined in the Establishment Clause.
Focusing on … endorsement or disapproval of religion clarifies the Lemon test as an
analytical device.”).
49
Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 70 (1985) (J., O’Connor, concurring
opinion).
50
Books, 401 F.3d at 867 (internal quotation omitted).
51
542 U.S. 1 (2004).
52
Id. at 37-43.
53
Id. at 34.
54
See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 587 (1992).
55
Id. at 577.
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public schools, the Supreme Court has only used the coercion test in
cases involving formal religious exercises.56 For example, in Lee v.
Weisman, the Supreme Court applied the coercion test where a rabbi
led the attendees of a school graduation ceremony in a prayer
complete with religious language including, “O God we are grateful to
You,” “We give thanks to You,” and “AMEN.”57 The Court struck
down the prayer because it coerced those present to participate in a
religious exercise.58 Similarly, in Santa Fe Independent School District
v. Doe, the Supreme Court applied the coercion test where a student
chaplain led a crowd in prayer over a school’s public address system
prior to home football games.59 Because the prayers were “infused
with explicit references to Jesus Christ and . . . appeal[ed] to
distinctively Christian beliefs,” the Court found that it coerced those
present to participate in a religious exercise.60
II.

GRADUATION LITIGATION PRIOR TO DOE EX REL
DOE

Only a few cases have directly addressed the constitutionality of
holding graduation ceremonies in religiously affiliated buildings.61 In
1916, the Wisconsin Supreme Court heard a challenge to a school
district’s practice of holding graduation in local churches.62 Because
the court found that “[t]he holding of graduation exercises in a church

56

Newdow v. U.S. Cong., 328 F.3d 466, 480-81 (9th Cir. 2002), rev’d sub
nom. Elk Grove Unified School District v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1 (2004).
57
505 U.S. at 581-82.
58
Id. at 599.
59
Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 299 (2000).
60
Id. at 299 n.7.
61
Christine Rienstra Kiracofe, Going to the Chapel, and We’re
Gonna…Graduate?: Do Public Schools Run Afoul of the Constitution by Holding
Graduation Ceremonies in Church Buildings? 266 Educ. L. Rep. 583, 589 (2011).
62
State ex rel. Conway v. Dist. Bd. of Joint Sch. Dist. No. 6 of Towns of
Plymouth, Wonewoc, and City of Elroy, 156 N.W. 477, 480 (Wis. 1916).
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is not in itself the giving of sectarian instruction,” it held that the
district had not violated Wisconsin’s state constitution.63
In 1952, the New Mexico Supreme Court heard a challenge to a
school district’s practice of holding graduation in a Presbyterian
church.64 Noting that “[t]he churches were the only buildings in
the . . . community with sufficient seating capacity to accommodate
the pupils and the people of the community,”65 the court held that the
practice did not violate the Establishment Clause.66
In 1974, the U.S. District Court of the Eastern District of
Wisconsin—the same court that decided Doe ex rel. Doe v. Elmbrook
School District—heard Lemke v. Black.67 In Lemke, the court found
that a school district’s practice of holding graduation at a Roman
Catholic church violated the Establishment Clause because the school
district failed to show “an overriding secular need to use those
particular facilities.”68 However, the District Court’s decision was
subsequently vacated on appeal as moot.69
In 2010, the U.S. District Court for the District of Connecticut
decided Does v. Enfield Public Schools.70 There, students and parents
challenged the district’s practice of holding high school graduation
ceremonies at a Christian church.71 The Enfield court focused on the
issues of endorsement, coercion, and excessive entanglement with
religion.72 With respect to endorsement, the court found that a
reasonable observer would likely believe that “holding . . . graduations
at First Cathedral constitutes an impermissible endorsement of religion
because it conveys the message that certain religious views are
63

Id. at 480-81.
Miller v. Cooper, 56 N.M. 355, 356 (1952).
65
Id. at 356.
66
Id. at 357.
67
376 F.Supp. 87 (E.D. Wis. 1974).
68
Id. at 89.
69
Lemke v. Black, 525 F.2d 694 (7th Cir. 1975).
70
716 F.Supp.2d 172 (D.Conn. 2010).
71
Id. at 175.
72
Id. at 185-202.
64
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embraced by Enfield Schools, and others are not.”73 With respect to
coercion, the court found that, “by requiring a graduating senior—or a
parent of one—to enter First Cathedral in order to be able to
participate in his or her graduation—or to watch their child graduate—
Enfield Public Schools has coerced plaintiffs to support religion.”74
And with respect to excessive entanglement, the court found that the
school district’s modifications of the physical interior of the church
constituted excessive entanglement of religion.75
Thus, different courts have emphasized vastly different aspects of
the practice of holding public graduation ceremonies in religious
buildings. While some courts emphasize practicality, such as the New
Mexico Supreme Court’s recognition of inadequate alternative spaces
for the graduation ceremonies76, others, such as the United States
District Court for the District of Connecticut, focus intensely on the
religiousness of the space itself.77
Further, courts give varying weight to the endorsement, coercion,
and Lemon tests. Like the Enfield court, an intense scrutiny on the
religious components of the interior, physical components of the
church would formed the basis for the Seventh Circuit’s en banc
opinion in Doe ex rel. Doe v. Elmbrook School District.78

73

Id. at 188-89.
Id. at 201.
75
Id. at 198-99.
76
Miller v. Cooper, 56 N.M. 355 (1952).
77
716 F.Supp.2d 172 (D.Conn. 2010).
78
Doe ex rel. Doe v. Elmbrook Sch. Dist., 687 F.3d 840, 842 (7th Cir. 2012);
716 F.Supp.2d 172 (D.Conn. 2010).
74
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III. DOE EX REL. DOE V. ELMBROOK SCHOOL DISTRICT
A. Factual Background
Elmbrook School District is located in Brookfield, Wisconsin, a
western suburb of Milwaukee.79 The District has two high schools,
Brookfield Central and Brookfield East.80 In 2000, Brookfield Central
began holding its graduation ceremony in the main sanctuary of
Elmbrook Church, a non-denominational, evangelical Christian
church; Brookfield East followed suit in 2002.81 Additionally,
Brookfield Central rented a smaller room in the Church for its senior
honors night.82
The original idea to hold Brookfield Central’s graduation
ceremony in the Church came from the officers of the senior class of
2000.83 They believed the current venue, the school’s gymnasium, was
“too hot, cramped, and uncomfortable.”84 Further, “those attending
were packed in; they had to sit on hard wooden bleachers or folding
chairs; and there was no air conditioning.”85 The student officers
proposed the idea to hold graduation in the church, which “had more
comfortable seats, air conditioning and ample free parking,” to the
District Superintendent and the entire senior class.86 The senior class
subsequently voted in favor of the proposal.87 The Principal made the
final decision to use the Church, and the Superintendent approved.88

79

Doe ex rel. Doe v. Elmbrook Sch. Dist., 658 F.3d 710, 734 (7th Cir. 2011),
reh’g en banc granted, opinion vacated (Nov. 17, 2011).
80
Id.
81
Id. at 713.
82
Id.
83
Id.
84
Id.
85
Id. at 734.
86
Id.
87
Id.
88
Id.
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A similar process took place at Brookfield East in 2002.89
Between 2002 and 2005, the senior class voted to choose between two
or three venues, one of which was always the church.90 Each time, the
Church “invariably emerged the overwhelming favorite.”91 In 2006,
the principals of the schools discontinued the “pointless” voting
process and continued holding graduation at the Church.92 The Church
charged the School District a “standard rate” between $2,000.00 and
$2,200.00 for each graduation ceremony.93
The atmosphere of the Church itself was unsurprisingly dominated by
Christian imagery and symbols.94 Crosses and other religious symbols
could be found on the exterior and interior of the Church.95 Upon
entering the Church, visitors passed through the Church lobby, which
contained tables and stations holding evangelical literature and
pamphlets, some of which were titled “young adults,” “couples
ministry,” “middle school ministry,” “high school ministry,” and
“college ministry.”96 Church personnel manned these stations during
the 2002 and 2009 graduation ceremonies; in fact, in 2002 they passed
out religious literature during the ceremony.97
The ceremony itself took place at the front of the Church, where a
large Latin cross was fixed to the wall and hung over the dais.98 While
the Church refused to veil the cross during the ceremony, it did agree
to remove all non-permanent religious symbols from the dais.99 During
the ceremony, graduating seniors sat in the front and center rows of
89

Id.
Id.
91
Id.
92
Doe ex rel. Doe v. Elmbrook School District, 687 F.3d 840, 845 (7th Cir.
2012).
93
Id. at 714.
94
Id. at 715.
95
Id.
96
Id. at 714-15.
97
Id.
98
Id. at 734.
99
Id.
90
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pews of the Church’s main level, while guests sat in other pews.100
Bibles and hymnal books remained in the pews, as well as other
religious literature such as a donation envelope and a yellow “Scribble
Card for God’s Little Lambs.”101
Objections to the District’s decision to hold the graduation
ceremony at the Church began in 2001, one year after the first
ceremony was held at the Church.102 Over the years, parents, nonprofit organizations and interest groups objected to holding graduation
at the Church.103 In response to these objections, the Superintendent
often noted that the District was in the process of obtaining funding for
a new field house and for renovations to the school’s gymnasium, and
that the school could host its graduation ceremony in either location.
After several efforts to obtain funding failed, the District finally
obtained the necessary funds to build a new field house.104After the
field house was completed in 2010, both high schools moved their
graduation ceremonies to the field house.105
The plaintiffs in Doe ex rel. Doe v. Elmbrook School District are
current and former non-Christian students of Elmbrook School
District.106 They “felt uncomfortable, upset, offended, unwelcome,
and/or angry” because of the intense religious atmosphere inside and
outside of the Church.107 The plaintiffs alleged that there were
alternative, religiously neutral venues that would have sufficed for the
graduation ceremony; though the School District contended none were
as attractive as the Church for the price.108

100

Id.
Id. at 715.
102
Id.
103
Id. at 715-17.
104
Id. at 734.
105
Id.
106
Id.
107
Id. at 717.
108
Id.
101
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B. The District Court’s Decision
Noting that “the [Supreme] Court has sidestepped Lemon in
several Establishment Clause cases,”109 the District Court used the
coercion test, the endorsement test, and the excessive entanglement
prong of the Lemon test and found no constitutional violation.110
In its coercion test analysis, the District Court found that the
School District did not impermissibly coerce graduation ceremony
attendees.111 The coercion test prohibits governmental entities from
coercing individuals to participate in religion or religious exercises.112
In Lee v. Weisman113 and Santa Fe Independent School District v.
Doe,114 the U.S. Supreme Court struck down the practice of reading a
prayer before a high school graduation ceremony and football games,
respectively. The District Court in Doe ex rel. Doe v. Elmbrook School
District distinguished Lee and Santa Fe because this case involves
“exposure to religious symbols” as opposed to “coerced religious
participation.”115
Regarding the excessive entanglement prong of the Lemon test,
the court in Doe ex rel. Doe v. Elmbrook School District noted that the
School District maintained complete control of the graduation
ceremonies, limited its interaction with the Church to arranging the
109

Does 1, 7, 8, 9, individually v. Elmbrook Joint Common Sch. Dist. No. 21,
No. 09-C-0409, 2010 WL 2854287, at *7 (E.D. Wis. July 19, 2010) aff'd sub nom.
Doe ex rel. Doe v. Elmbrook Sch. Dist., 658 F.3d 710 (7th Cir. 2011), reh’g en banc
granted, opinion vacated (Nov. 17, 2011) and rev’d and remanded sub nom. Doe ex
rel. Doe v. Elmbrook Sch. Dist., 687 F.3d 840 (7th Cir. 2012).
110
Id. at *15.
111
Id. at *10.
112
Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 587 (1992).
113
505 U.S. 577, 587 (1992).
114
530 U.S. 290 (2000).
115
Doe ex rel. Doe v. Elmbrook School District, 658 F.3d at 710, 718 (quoting
Does 1, 7, 8, 9, individually, 09-C-0409, 2010 WL 2854287, at *9 (E.D. Wis. July
19, 2010) aff'd sub nom. Doe ex rel. Doe v. Elmbrook Sch. Dist., 658 F.3d 710 (7th
Cir. 2011), reh’g en banc granted, opinion vacated (Nov. 17, 2011) and rev’d and
remanded sub nom. Doe ex rel. Doe v. Elmbrook Sch. Dist., 687 F.3d 840 (7th Cir.
2012)).
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rental, attempted to have non-permanent religious items removed from
the Church, and in no way delegated its authority to the Church.116
Thus, the court found no violation under the Lemon test.117
In its endorsement analysis, the court “‘assess[ed] the totality of
the circumstances’ surrounding the event to determine whether an
‘objective, reasonable observer, aware of the history and context of the
community and forum’ would fairly understand the event to be a
government endorsement of religion.”118 Ultimately, the Seventh
Circuit found that the School District’s decision to hold graduation
ceremonies in a church “holds symbolic force,”119 but that a
reasonable observer who understood the reasons for holding
graduation in the Elmbrook Church, namely the adequate space,
modern amenities, close location, and reasonable cost, would not
understand the decision to constitute an endorsement of religion.120
C. The Seventh Circuit’s Three-Judge Panel Decision
The three-judge panel that heard Doe ex rel. Doe v. Elmbrook
School District on appeal was comprised of Judge Ripple, Judge
Flaum, and Chief Judge Easterbrook.121 Judge Ripple wrote the
majority opinion in which Chief Judge Easterbrook joined.122 Judge

116

Does 1, 7, 8, 9, individually, 09-C-0409, 2010 WL 2854287, at *14 (E.D.
Wis. July 19, 2010) aff'd sub nom. Doe ex rel. Doe v. Elmbrook Sch. Dist., 658 F.3d
710 (7th Cir. 2011), reh’g en banc granted, opinion vacated (Nov. 17, 2011) and
rev’d and remanded sub nom. Doe ex rel. Doe v. Elmbrook Sch. Dist., 687 F.3d 840
(7th Cir. 2012).
117
Id.
118
Id. at *11 (quoting Books v. Elkhart Cnty, Ind,. 401 F.3d 857, 866-67 (7th
Cir. 2005).
119
Id. at *13.
120
Id. at *12-13.
121
Doe ex rel. Doe v. Elmbrook Sch. Dist., 658 F.3d 710, 712 (7th Cir. 2011).
122
Id.
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Flaum’s dissenting opinion formed the basis for what would later be
the en banc opinion for the entire Seventh Circuit.123
The majority opinion conducted its Establishment Clause analysis
in two parts: coercion and endorsement.124 Regarding coercion, the
majority found that “the Establishment Clause does not shield citizens
from encountering the beliefs or symbols of any faith to which they do
not subscribe” and that “graduates are not forced—even subtly—to
participate in any religious exercise.”125 The court also noted that the
attendees of the graduation ceremony are not forced to take pamphlets
or to sit through attempts at proselytization and that the encounter with
religion is “purely passive and incidental to attendance at an entirely
secular ceremony.”126 Thus, the court found that the passive religious
iconography present in Elmbrook Church did not coerce those present
to participate in religion or religious exercise.127
Regarding endorsement, the court asked whether “a reasonable
person, apprised of the circumstances surrounding the [practice]” and
“familiar with the history of the government practice at issue” would
understand the graduation ceremony to endorse religion.128 Noting that
the church was rented at the suggestion of the graduates themselves,
the court found that “an objective observer would understand the
religious symbols and messages in the [Church] and on Church
grounds to be part of the underlying setting as the District found it
rather than as an expression of adherence or approval by the
school.”129

123

Id. at 734-40; Doe ex rel. Doe v. Elmbrook School District 687 F.3d 840,
842-56. (7th Cir. 2012).
124
Id. at 725-34.
125
Id. at 727 (internal citations omitted).
126
Id.
127
Id. at 728-29.
128
Id. at 730 (quoting Milwaukee Deputy Sheriffs’ Ass’n v. Clarke, 588 F.3d
523, 528 (7th Cir. 2009).
129
Id. at 731.
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Thus, the three-judge panel found no coercion and no
endorsement of religion and therefore held the practice of holding the
graduation ceremonies in Elmbrook Church constitutional.130
D. The Seventh Circuit’s En Banc Decision
Similar to the District Court of Connecticut in Enfield, the
Seventh Circuit focused its analysis on endorsement and coercion in
its en banc decision in Doe ex. rel. Doe v. Elmbrook School District.
The En Banc Panel’s Endorsement Analysis

1.

The en banc decision in Doe ex. rel. Doe v. Elmbrook School
District found that holding the graduation ceremony in Elmbrook
Church impermissibly endorsed religion.131 Several facts contributed
to this finding: “a 15 to 20 foot tall Latin cross,” the passing out of
religious pamphlets, a poster depicting pop culture icons next to Jesus,
religious banners hanging from the ceiling, and pews supplied with
Bibles, hymnals, and other religious literature.132 In general, the court
found that the “sheer religiosity of the space created a likelihood that
high school students and their younger siblings would perceive a link
between church and state.”133
2.

The En Banc Panel’s Coercion Analysis

The en banc decision found that holding the graduation ceremony
in Elmbrook Church “carried an impermissible aspect of coercion.”134
Specifically, the en banc panel found that holding graduation in the
Elmbrook Church was coercive for two reasons. First, present in this
case was the concern from Lee v. Weisman that “graduation
130

Id. at 734.
Doe ex rel. Doe v. Elmbrook Sch. Dist., 687 F.3d 840, 852 (7th Cir. 2012).
132
Id. at 852-53.
133
Id. at 853.
134
Id. at 856.
131
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ceremonies were effectively obligatory even if attendance was
technically voluntary.”135 And given that graduation ceremonies were
obligatory, the Elmbrook School District violated the principle that
“‘[n]either a state nor the Federal Government . . . can force nor
influence a person to go to or to remain away from church against his
will.’”136
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT’S EN BANC
OPINION
A. The Court Expands, Without Precedent, the Possibility of
Finding Unconstitutional Government Endorsement/Coercion
by the Religiousness of a Particular Space
The Supreme Court has never found that a school that attempted
to decrease the degree of religiousness of a particular space violated
the Establishment Clause.137 The majority decision thus expands the
concepts of coercion and endorsement of religion into a new realm of
Establishment Clause jurisprudence. While each Establishment Clause
case “calls for line drawing” and “no fixed, per se rule can be
framed,”138 the majority decision in Doe ex rel. Doe v. Elmbrook
School District applies the coercion and endorsement tests in an
entirely new way.
Indeed, the majority mistakes previous Supreme Court precedent
where schools increased the religiousness of a previously secular
space to the facts of this case, where the school district attempted to
decrease the religiousness of a previously religious space. The
majority wrote, “If . . . a school cannot create a pervasively religious
environment in the classroom . . . it appears overly formalistic to allow
135

Id. at 854.
Id. at 855 (alteration in original) (quoting Everson v. Bd. of Educ. of Ewing
Twp., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947)).
137
A review of Establishment Clauses cases involving schools yielded findings
of unconstitutionality only where schools used religion in a certain way or interacted
with a religious institution.
138
Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 678 (1984).
136
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a school to engage in identical practices when it acts through a shortterm lease.”139 There, the Seventh Circuit misstated what Elmbrook
School District did in this case. Elmbrook School District did not
“create a pervasively religious environment” but rather, the District
temporarily leased an already-existing religious space for the use of a
completely secular activity while removing as much of the religious
iconography and imagery as possible.140 This case would be very
different if Elmbrook School District increased the religiousness
inside the Church. But that is not what occurred here. Conversely, the
administration of Elmbrook School District tried to make the
atmosphere of the church as religiously-neutral as possible; a fact the
Seventh Circuit overlooked in its analysis.
B. The Majority Improperly Applies the Endorsement Test by not
using the “Reasonable Observer” Standard
In its endorsement analysis, the Seventh Circuit did not ask
whether a reasonable observer would perceive holding graduation
inside Elmbrook Church as an endorsement of religion.141 Rather, the
Seventh Circuit wrote, “[r]egardless of the purpose of school
administrators in choosing the location, the sheer religiosity of the
space created a likelihood that high school students and their younger
siblings would perceive a link between church and state. That is, the
activity conveyed a message of endorsement.”142 Justice O’Connor,
the author of the endorsement test, expressly rejected this form of
subjective analysis.143 In Elk Grove Unified School District v.
Newdow, she wrote:
139

Doe ex rel. Doe v. Elmbrook School District 687 F.3d 840, 856. (internal
citations omitted).
140
Id. at 846.
141
Salazar v. Buono, 559 U.S. 700, 1824 (2010) (Roberts, J., concurring)
(“The endorsement test views a challenged display through the eyes of a
hypothetical reasonable observer.”).
142
Id. at 853 (emphasis added).
143
Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 34-35 (2004).
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Nearly any government action could be overturned as a
violation of the Establishment Clause if a “heckler’s
veto” sufficed to show that its message was one of
endorsement. ‘There is always someone who, with a
particular quantum of knowledge, reasonably might
perceive a particular action as an endorsement of
religion.”144
Thus, by conducting its analysis through the eyes of the high
school students and their younger siblings, the Seventh Circuit
engaged in the exactly opposite type of analysis that the “reasonable
observer” standard requires: whether “an objective, reasonable
observer, aware of the history and context of the community and forum
in which the religious display appears, would fairly understand the
display to be a government endorsement of religion.”145
C. The En Banc Opinion Improperly Applies the Coercion Test
The majority used the coercion test in its analysis of Doe ex. rel.
Doe v. Elmbrook School District.146 However use of the coercion test
was inappropriate in this case, and furthermore, the court conducted
the test improperly. First, in the context of public schools, the coercion
test has only been applied to cases involving formal religious
exercises.147 For instance, in Lee, the Court applied the coercion test to
a high school’s practice of reading a prayer at its graduation
ceremony148 and in Santa Fe, the Court applied the coercion test to a
high school’s practice of reading a prayer over the public
144

Id. at 35 (quoting Capitol Square Review and Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515
U.S. 753, 780 (1995)).
145
Books v. Elkhart Cnty. Ind, 401 F.3d 857, 867 (7th Cir. 2005) (emphasis
added) (internal quotations omitted).
146
Doe ex rel. Doe v. Elmbrook Sch. Dist., 687 F.3d 840, 854-56 (7th Cir.
2012).
147
Croft v. Perry, 624 F.3d 157, 169-70 (5th Cir. 2010).
148
Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 587 (1992).
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announcement system before a football game.149 Thus, even applying
the coercion test to Elmbrook constituted a departure from
Establishment Clause jurisprudence, which has limited its application.
Second, the Seventh Circuit relied on its finding of “government
endorsement” to subsequently find that such “endorsement” also
constituted coercion of religion.150 In support of this reasoning, the
majority cites Wallace v. Jaffree.151 However, because Wallace
involved a statute authorizing students to use a moment of silence for
prayer, a formal religious exercise,152 the majority’s reliance on
Wallace to distinguish it from Lee and Santa Fe is unconvincing.
Further, the en banc opinion of Doe ex rel. Doe v. Elmbrook
School District blurs the line between the endorsement and coercion
tests. In its opinion, the majority states, “the practice of holding high
school graduation ceremonies in the Elmbrook Church sanctuary
conveys an impermissible message of endorsement. Under the
circumstances here, the message of endorsement carried an
impermissible aspect of coercion.”153 However, as Judge Easterbrook
notes in his dissenting opinion, “the majority does not explain how
endorsement coerces.”154 And indeed, it is difficult to reconcile cases
like Lee and Santa Fe where prayers were read aloud at a graduation
ceremony and a high school football game,155 with the fact that the
Elmbrook School District’s entire graduation ceremony was secular in
nature.156

149

Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 299 (2000).
687 F.3d at 856.
151
Id. at 855 (citing Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985)).
152
Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 40 (1985).
153
Id. at 856.
154
687 F.3d at 870 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting).
155
Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992); Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist v. Doe,
530 U.S. 290 (2000).
156
687 F.3d at 842.
150
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D. The En Banc Opinion Leaves No Room for Practicality
Suppose that Elmbrook School District was not located in a
suburb of Milwaukee, but was instead located in a rural part of central
Wisconsin where Elmbrook Church was the only space that could
adequately and comfortably hold the graduation ceremony attendees.
Would the “pervasively religious” atmosphere of the Church still
constitute government endorsement and coercion of religion if it were
the only available option? Unlike the analysis conducted by the New
Mexico Supreme Court in Miller v. Cooper,157 the majority opinion
does not leave room for this possibility, nor does it acknowledge the
rigidity of its holding. Indeed, there is ample evidence in the record
showing the inadequate functionality of the school’s gymnasium.158
While the en banc opinion acknowledged this fact in the “Facts”
section,159 it failed to consider it in its analysis.
CONCLUSION
Without clear direction from the U.S. Supreme Court, courts are
left guessing how to correctly apply the Lemon, coercion, and
endorsement tests. The inconsistent results between the District Court,
three-judge panel, and en banc panel of the Seventh Circuit in Doe ex
rel. Doe v. Elmbrook School District exemplify this principle. Courts
engage in exhaustive analyses, but are left with inconsistent and
157

56 N.M. 355 (1952).
Doe ex rel. Doe v. Elmbrook Sch. Dist., 687 F.3d 840, 844 n.2 (“In
September 1999, the senior class officers sent a letter to Superintendent Gibson
making their case for the Church: ‘We request that the site of the ceremony be
changed to an auditorium in Elmbrook Church . . . The seating in the Brookfield
Central Gymnasium is very limited, causing the atmosphere to be very busy and
perhaps even chaotic. On top of the crowding, the temperature in the Gymnasium
gets extremely hot in the month of June. We feel that the Elmbrook Church will
overcome the limitations of space and temperature control, providing ample
comfortable seating and an air-conditioned room. The cushioned seats are also much
more comfortable in comparison to the hard, wooden bleachers available at
school.’).
159
Id. at 844.
158
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conflicting results. Here, the Seventh Circuit’s endorsement analysis
took on a subjective viewpoint and its coercion analysis was stretched
beyond the area of a religious exercise. Until the U.S. Supreme Court
either formulates a comprehensive Establishment Clause analysis or
directly addresses the constitutionality of holding graduation
ceremonies in religious venues, it is likely that courts will continue to
make inconsistent rulings.
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